If optimal tax theory is to be the basis for calculating tax rates, a close understanding is required of the relationship between the structure of preferences and the configuration of optimal tax rates. Otherwise hypotheses chosen by the econometrician for practical convenience may completely determine the results, independently of measurement. This paper explores the relationship between various types of separability, particularly weak and implicit separability, and optimal tax rates in the various models discussed in the literature. The use of distance functions and the Antonelli matrix provides a significant unification of previously disparate results.
frameworks are considered: the one consumer Ramsey-rule economy, the many consumer economy with linear income tax and proportional commodity taxes, and the continuum of consumers economy with general nonlinear taxes. In each framework separability assumptions will be varied parametrically and the effects on the structure of taxes deduced. Several of the results in the paper are well known. However, by adopting a rather different approach from normal, a unity in previously rather disparate results is revealed, and this greatly helps to simplify the analysis.
The first section of the paper is devoted to prior methodological issues. Much use is made in the main analysis of inverse compensated demand functions relating prices to utility and to quantities consumed. Although such functions were discussed by Hicks [15] , they are relatively unfamiliar and a brief discussion of their properties is given. In the present context, their usefulness lies in the ease with which they enable the change in the marginal rate of substitution between two goods to be broken up into movements along an indifference curve and movements outwards or inwards along a quantity ray. This decomposition is crucial since it turns out that, in all the models considered, differences in tax rates between commodities can be related to the effects of leisure on the marginal rate of substitution between the corresponding commodities. These effects are crucially dependent on separability assumptions between goods and leisure, and the consequences of two types of separability-weak separability and implicit or quasi-separability-are extensively explored. Section 2 derives the optimal tax formulae for each framework in a common format and the implications of separability are discussed. In the case which is analytically the most difficult, the model with many consumers, a linear income tax and proportional commodity taxes, approximation formulae are used. These replace the demand functions by local linearizations which have the effect of allowing perfect aggregation over households. Section 3 is a preliminary discussion of empirical implementation of the results. Section 4 summarizes the main findings.
COMPENSATED INVERSE DEMANDS AND THE ANALYSIS OF SEPARABILITY
With any indifference curve u and quantity ray q (the arrow indicates that scale is unimportant) it is possible, given convex preferences, to associate a vector of price to expenditure ratios x-1 such that a consumer on u faced with prices proportional to x -p will purchase a quantity bundle along q. Figure 1 illustrates. We write these functions () x -li = aj(u, q) ( 
1) Pi
where ai is homogeneous of degree zero in q. These functions are dual to the more familiar Hicksian compensated demands (2) qi = hik(u, p).
As is well known, the Hicksian demands are the partial derivatives with respect 
a,, (u q)= aq = aqiaq1
The elements aii form the Antonelli matrix which is clearly symmetric and negative semi-definite. (For a full analysis of these functions and their properties, see Deaton [5] .) The Antonelli matrix is useful in tax theory since it can be used to "invert" its generalized inverse, the Slutsky matrix, and thus to rewrite any expressions involving substitution effects. The inversion formula used in the next section is derived from the identity where I is the identity matrix, p,q are column vectors, and a prime denotes transposition. Note that (7'), together with the homogeneity requirement Aq = 0, defines A given S, p, q, and x. Explicit formulae for calculating A will be given later; for the moment, (7) is all that is required for the theory. It will be convenient to treat leisure asymmetrically and we decompose the q vector into (q0, q) with leisure denoted as good 0; the corresponding price is po. Each consumer faces a budget constraint (8) poqo + E pkqk= poT + b _ x for time endowment T and transfer income b. The quantity x is "full" income or total expenditure. With these interpretations of q, p, and x, the foregoing analysis goes through with all indices running from 0 to n.
If we confine the analysis to situations where all commodities are purchased, we can write the marginal rate of substitution between goods i and j, MRSij, in each of the following ways: MRS.j = Pijpj =ui/uj = ai(u, q)/aj(u, q), for marginal utilities ui = av/aqi. By using ai/aj rather than uiluj for MRS., we can decompose changes in MRS into those along an indifference curve and those out along a ray. This is precisely analogous to the usual decomposition into income and substitution effects in the dual space. In this latter, compensation is ensured by a change in income or equivalently, a proportional change in prices, while in the primal space, compensation is by a proportional change in quantities. In particular, we shall be interested in the effects of changes in leisure and we write a log(ui /ui) a log(ai /aj) a log(ai /aj) a U aqo aqo au aqo ) so that utility is weakly homogeneously separable. Hence, the intersection of weak and implicit separability is the homogeneous case which implies that the total expenditure elasticities of all goods are unity.
OPTIMAL TAX FORMULAE
In this section, we make no attempt to go beyond the standard first-order conditions which are familiar in the literature. As has been emphasized by Mirrlees [17] these conditions are not only not sufficient for a tax optimum, they may not even be necessary. The implications deduced are thus properties of the conventional formulae and not necessarily of the tax optimum. Nevertheless, one might hope that some tax optima, at least, satisfy these conditions. 
Es,ktk= aq, + f8l0 (I= ,.. . n). 0 Multiply (15) by aji, sum over i, and apply the inversion formula (7). Hence (16) X E a,S1ktk= (18) is zero so that no discriminatory taxes are required, instead a uniform tax on commodities or, its equivalent, a proportional income tax should be imposed. Under weak separability, however, by (11), the Ramsey rule implies that those goods which are relative necessities at the optimum should be taxed relatively highly. We shall describe this case by saying that commodity taxes are "regressive." Hence, if the Ramsey rule is used to calculate commodity taxes from a model such as the linear expenditure system which is strongly, and hence, a fortiori, weakly separable, regressive commodity taxes must always result; see e.g. the calculations in Atkinson and Stiglitz [2] . However, there is no general presupposition that the Ramsey rule is equity disregarding in this way. Indeed, it is not implausible to suppose that, in general, relative luxuries are also relatively complementary with leisure. In this case, (18) would produce a progressive commodity tax structure.
Case 2: An Unidimensional Continuum of Consumers with Nonlinear
Taxes-Atkinson and Stiglitz [3] It is here assumed that nonlinear taxes can be levied on all goods although, once again, leisure is by convention untaxed. Consumers thus face prices zi + Ti(qi) for producer prices zi and tax functions Ti(qi) dependent on qi alone. Consumers are indexed by the variable po which has density function f(po) over consumers. For convenience, the social welfare function is assumed to be additive over consumers so that the problem is to maximize where ,ii is the average compensated own-price elasticity for good i. The numerator of (31') is a "social" luxury index for good i so that the formulae represents a ratio of equity to efficiency effects evaluated at the tax optimum. A more general solution cannot be obtained by applying the inversion formulae to (31) directly since, without restrictions on preferences, it is not always possible to find preferences which for po (or any other level of po) will generate sij and j. However it is possible to justify such aggregation as an approximation. Each term in (38) taken separately is positive so that the sign of /8 depends on the balance between p, government revenue as a proportion of potential GDP, and (po -p&)/po, the measure of pre-tax social inequality, multiplied by the (positive) term in square brackets. Equations (37) can now be examined through a series of special cases.
Case 1-Quasi-separability: Only the second term in (37) is nonzero, so that provided there is some initial (perceived) inequality, the commodity tax system is progressive.
Case 2-Weak Separability: In this case (37) has a uniform tax solution with the value of the tax rate chosen to satisfy u -u * -/aau/aq0 = 0. This is the case examined in Deaton [6] and it should be emphasized that this uniformity result requires the linear Engel curve assumption which underlies the current analysis. Given the cost function (32), explicit solutions for the tax rate are possible provided we deal only with rank-order social welfare functions; the topic is too extensive to be discussed here and will be presented in a separate paper.
Case 3-No Inequality: There will be no post-tax inequality (u = u*) if and only if there is no pre-tax inequality (po = p*) at least as perceived by the social welfare function. If this is so (37) reduces to the Ramsey rule (18) . Note the special place occupied by good 0, leisure. This is not because of equity effects operating through differences in ph since, in this case, there are no such differences. Rather the asymmetry is due to the numeraire role of labor (or leisure). Since leisure is untaxed, government revenue is implicitly measured in labor units so that by taxing complements with the revenue good, taxation is rendered easier. In general, the government will presumably wish to purchase goods other than labor and this would lead to a different tax rule. For example, a king who must pay a tribute of oxen to a neighboring conqueror would do well to levy relatively high taxes on goods complementary with oxen.
Case 4-Pure Redistribution: With p = 0, /8 is unambiguously negative and commodity taxes can either be progressive or regressive. The equity effect in favor of high taxation on luxuries operates as in Case 1 but there is also a presumption in favor of high taxation on goods which are complementary with work (substitutable for leisure). This is presumably because of the comparative advantage enjoyed by the rich in work, so that post-tax inequality is reduced by discouraging it. In any case goods which are both luxuries and complementary with work should be highly taxed (first-class travel, academic books?).
Case 5: In general all these forces operate simultaneously. Note, in particular that (38) suggests (but does not prove) that the tax structure may switch from progressivity to regressivity as the government revenue requirement increases.
Note finally the clear family resemblance between the optimal tax formulae in the three models, equations (18) This suggests a fundamental unity between the results which has been previously obscured by the fact that Cases 1 and 3 are usually dealt with in price space-giving a solution in quantity space while Case 2 is dealt with in quantity space with its solution in price space. In substantive terms, (39) suggests that differential commodity taxes are related quite generally both to the degree of luxury of the goods and to the degree of complementarity with leisure. The former is a pure equity effect while the latter has aspects of both equity and efficiency, one operating to tax complements with work, the other to tax complements with leisure.
SOME EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS
If the tax formulae of the previous section are to be implemented we need empirical estimates of the Antonelli matrix and of the derivatives of the inverse compensated demands with respect to utility. Econometricians are much more used to measuring the dual concepts, the parameters of the Hicksian demands. In principle, it is possible to estimate inverse demand functions in which prices are regressed on quantities consumed. But, in most modern economies, and isolated commodities apart, it is not very sensible to regard quantities consumed as exogenous to consumers with price determined by income and tastes. Clearly then, we must estimate the commodity demands and then calculate from these the quantities we require.
Assume that we have estimated a system of demand equations, including the demand for leisure, so that estimates of the Slutsky matrix S (as functions of x and p) and of the income derivatives are available. Recalling (7'), i.e. The first is that the difficulty of estimating the separate effects in collinear time-series of wages, prices, and transfer income, makes it necessary to use restrictive and largely untested assumptions. For example, the study by Phlips uses forms of the linear expenditure system which, by incorporating additive separability and linear Engel curves, assume values for the very quantities we wish to measure and guarantee by assumption a uniform tax structure. More general models avoid this difficulty but are conditional on the assumption that individuals are indeed free to vary their supply of labor given an exogenously determined wage. For many, if not most workers, such an assumption is implausible. Clearly, many workers can alter their working conditions by negotiation, either individually or through unions, and wages and prices will play a part in this process. But this is far from a justification for measuring the substitution effects of goods prices on labor supply by regressing commodity and leisure demands on prices and wages. A more hopeful approach would seem to lie in making the opposite assumption, that in any given period, hours worked are outside the worker's control. In such a framework, leisure is preset at some "ration" level and commodity demands are preconditioned on this value. Provided the pre-set level varies over time, or in cross-sections from household to household, rationing theory tells us that we should be able to identify the substitution effects by comparing the effects on commodity demands of changes in the ration level with utility held constant. Some of the details of how this should be done, as well as how to treat a sample in which there are observations of both rationing and of free choice, are discussed in Deaton [7] and Deaton and Muellbauer [9] .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, rules for optimal differential commodity taxes have been derived for the three different cases usually studied in the literature: the one consumer economy, the unidimensional continuum of consumers economy, and the finite number of discrete consumers economy. In each case, duality theory has been systematically used to give formulae relating to the tax rates themselves rather than to the effects of the taxes on quantities consumed. While these rules do not give explicit forms for the tax rates since these implicitly enter into the other variables, they are nevertheless capable of yielding fresh insights about the structure of an optimal tax general equilibrium. In particular, in all three models, differences in commodity tax rates are seen to be linked to differences in the degree of luxury and differences in the degree of complementarity with leisure. The effects of assuming either weak or quasi-separability are studied for each of the three cases and it is shown that although separability between goods and leisure in all cases simplifies the tax rule, in some cases reducing it to a prescription for uniform taxes, the structure of taxes, whether uniform, regressive or progressive, depends crucially on exactly how separability is formulated. It is thus of central importance that empirical work directed towards providing parameters for evaluating optimal tax formulae should employ functional forms sufficiently general to allow measurement rather than assumption to determine the structure of taxcs.
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